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THE NON-DISCHARGEABILITY OF PRIVATE STUDENT
LOANS: A LOOMING FINANCIAL CRISIS?
ABSTRACT
In 2005, Congress altered 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) to exclude private student
loans from discharge in bankruptcy. The change was a line-item in a larger
bankruptcy bill, but it has had massive effects on the higher education market
in the United States.
This Comment will show how granting private student loans the privileged
status of being non-dischargeable in bankruptcy skews lenders’ incentives.
Because private student lenders know that their debts cannot be discharged,
they have no incentive to consider a student borrower’s ability to repay. As a
result, most students are granted a nearly unlimited line of credit without
lenders worrying about those students’ ability to repay. This Comment argues
that this phenomenon has thus led to skyrocketing university tuition rates in the
past decade, which in turn has created the need for students to borrow even
more. This troubling cycle is creating a bubble in the higher education market,
which will have disastrous effects if left unaddressed.
This Comment will also propose a solution to this problem. By allowing
students to discharge private student loans in bankruptcy, Congress could
create a self-sustaining mechanism in the private student loan market by
restoring lenders’ incentives to gauge students’ ability to repay. If Congress
changes the Bankruptcy Code to allow private student loans to be discharged
in bankruptcy, lenders will only grant loans proportionately to a student’s
ability to pay. This Comment ultimately argues that this small change will have
far-reaching and highly beneficial results for the nation’s economy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2015, roughly 20.2 million students were expected to attend
colleges and universities across the United States, constituting over 4.9 million
more students than in the fall of 2000.1 Between 2002 and 2012 alone, college
enrollment in the United States increased by 24%.2 Not only are more students
attending college, but they are paying a higher price for this education than
ever before.3 Controlled for inflation, the average four-year private university
tuition in 1974 was $10,273, measured in 2014 dollars.4 By 2014, this average
figure had risen to $31,231, an increase of roughly 204%.5
The historical increases in college enrollment and tuition rates have made
financing higher education big business in the United States.6 Student loans are
the second-highest form of consumer debt facing our nation behind mortgages,
accounting for $1.2 trillion of debt.7 The average student graduating in 2012
owed $29,400, which is over $10,000 more than the average student debt just
ten years ago.8 Legislatures have taken notice of this explosive rise in debt and
are proposing legislation to help distressed student loan debtors find a way out
of their predicaments.9
Of special interest to this Comment are the changes to the Higher
Education Act proposed by Senator Tom Harkin, one of which would allow

1

Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.
asp?id=372 (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
2 Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98 (last
visited Dec. 29, 2015).
3 See Doug Short, A Depressing Look at Income Growth Compared to Health Care and College Costs,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2011, 5:29 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/college-and-health-cost-versusincome-2011-3.
4 Trends in College Pricing, COLL. BD. (2015), http://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figurestables/tuition-fees-room-board-time-1974-75-2014-15-selected-years.
5 See id.
6 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS 17 fig.4 (2012), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf (showing that the private student
loan industry alone was worth over $10 billion by 2008).
7 Chris Denhart, How the $1.2 Trillion College Debt Crisis Is Crippling Students, Parents, and the
Economy, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/specialfeatures/2013/08/07/howthe-college-debt-is-crippling-students-parents-and-the-economy/.
8 Tyler Kingkade, Average Student Debt Climbs to $29,400, up 63 Percent in Less than a Decade:
Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/04/averagestudent-debt-2012_n_4380946.html.
9 See Reyna Gobel, Dems Rush to Propose Student Loan Legislation in Election Year, FORBES (July 2,
2014,
11:57
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/reynagobel/2014/07/02/dems-rush-to-defend-studentborrowers-in-election-year/.
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debtors to discharge all private student loan debts in bankruptcy.10 Under the
current system, discharging any student loan is difficult and can only be done
in rare instances where the debtor can show that keeping the debt will cause an
“undue hardship.”11 Because student loan debts are so rarely discharged in
bankruptcy, private lenders have less incentive to worry about the ability of
borrowers to repay and will grant students nearly infinite lines of credit for
higher education.12 This effect can be seen in the number of outstanding
private student loans over time.13 Until the 2005 amendments, private student
loans were dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).14 In 2005,
when private student loans were first exempted from discharge, $6.6 billion in
private student loans were granted by lenders.15 This number jumped to
$7.8 billion the next year, and was above $10 billion by 2008.16
The fact that the private student loan industry saw a 50% increase in the
years immediately following a change in the Code pertaining to private student
loans is likely no coincidence. Thus, it seems that the exemption of private
student loans from discharge is at least partially to blame for the spiraling cost
of college tuition and the ballooning level of student loan debt seen in the
United States. In order to fight the negative effects of this amendment,
Congress should follow Senator Harkin’s suggestion and allow private student
debts to be discharged in bankruptcy as they were before the 2005 amendments
to the Code.17

10

See id.
See Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Bankruptcy Discharge of Student Loan on Ground of Undue
Hardship Under § 523(a)(8)(B) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1998).
12 Kayla Webley, Is Forgiving Student Loan Debt a Good Idea?, TIME BUS. (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/04/20/is-forgiving-student-loan-debt-a-good-idea/ (“Virtually everyone who
applies is approved for almost unlimited student loans, regardless of how likely they are to be able to pay them
back. But lenders aren’t really concerned about that because student loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.
They know they’ll get their money back one way or another.”).
13 See Diana Jean Schemo, Private Loans Deepen a Crisis in Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/us/10loans.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (“[P]rivate loans have become
the fastest-growing sector of the student finance market, more than tripling over five years to $17.3 billion in
the 2005-06 school year . . . .”).
14 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220,
119 Stat. 23, 59.
15 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 6.
16 Id.
17
Higher Education Affordability Act, S. 2954, 113th Cong. § 1031 (2014).
11
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
Student loans were not always exempt from discharge in bankruptcy.18 In
fact, prior to 1976, all student loans were eligible for discharge in
bankruptcy.19 In 1976, Congress changed this policy by enacting § 439(A) of
the Higher Education Act of 1965.20 This Act mandated that student loans
would be exempt from discharge in bankruptcy unless: 1) they became due
more than five years before the date of filing, or 2) exempting the discharge
would cause an “undue hardship” on the debtor and his dependents.21 The
reasoning behind Congress’s decision to exempt federal loans was largely due
to a desire to protect the solvency of the federal student loan program from the
perceived abuses of bankruptcy discharge.22 Congress’s fear of rampant
student loan debt abuse was largely based on anecdotal evidence.23 At the time,
there were stories circulating about students getting “free” educations by
discharging their student debts upon graduation without trying to make any
repayments or showing extenuating circumstances.24 Despite Congress’s fear,
empirical studies conducted recently have found that when the Higher
Education Act was enacted, less than 1% of all federal student loans were
discharged in bankruptcy.25 Clearly, Congress’s fears were unfounded, and the
abuse of student loan discharge was too minor to threaten the federal student
loan program in any way.26 Yet, over time, more and more forms of student
debts have become exempted from discharge under this same guise of
preventing abuse.27

18

See 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976) (providing a list of debts that cannot be discharged, with loans for
educational purposes not on the list).
19 See Rafael Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge
Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 180 (2009).
20 See Campbell, supra note 11.
21 See id.
22 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181.
23 See supra note 19, at 180–81 (“Congress took this action on the basis of perceived abuses. . . . relying
on a few stories of recent graduates who had obtained discharges of their student loans without any attempted
repayment and in the absence of extenuating circumstances.”).
24 See id.
25 Id. at 181.
26 Id.
27 See id.
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The original Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978 officially codified the
student loan exemption from the Higher Education Act at § 523(a)(8).28
Section 523(a)(8) exempted the discharge of any debt “to a governmental unit,
or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an educational loan,” unless
the loan first became due five years before filing for bankruptcy, or excepting
the debt from discharge would impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor and
the debtor’s dependents.29 In 1979, this language was amended to exempt from
discharge any “educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a
governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education.”30 Yet another
round of amendments in 1984 removed the wording “of higher education,”
effectively exempting from discharge all non-profit student loans, regardless of
who made the loan.31 The time frame after which an individual could discharge
student loans under § 523(a)(8) increased from five to seven years in 1990.32
Then in 1998, Congress changed the wording once again to abolish the
discharge after seven years exemption, leaving the “undue hardship” exception
as the only way to discharge student loans covered by § 523(a)(8).33
Perhaps the largest change to the Code came recently in 2005, when
Congress added § 523(a)(8)(B) which exempts private student loans from
discharge.34 These 2005 amendments were the most recent change to
§ 523(a)(8) and resulted in the current statute.35 Under the current provisions,
unless there is a showing of “undue hardship,” discharge does not apply to:
[A]n educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution; or an obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or any other educational loan that is a
qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the

28 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8), 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 454, 98 Stat.
333, 376.
32 See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621, 104 Stat. 4789, 4965.
33 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837.
34 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220,
119 Stat. 23, 59.
35 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181.
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Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an
individual.36

Under this wording, all forms of student debt, public or private, are exempt
from discharge in bankruptcy, absent a showing of “undue hardship.”37 The
reasons given by Congress for the 2005 amendments to the Code were to
ensure that “the system is fair for both debtors and creditors” and to “respond
to many of the factors contributing to the increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings . . . to eliminate abuse in the system.”38 Although the goal of the
amendment was to eliminate abuse, many critics, including Senator Richard
Durbin, argued no evidence existed to suggest that private student loan debts
would be subject to abuse at a rate higher than any other consumer debt.39 Not
only is there scarce evidence of student loan abuse, but the private student loan
industry had been growing before the 2005 amendments, making it hard to
believe that abuse was threatening the industry.40
The change exempting private student loans from discharge instead seems
to be the result of a “sweetheart deal” between Congress and the private
student loan industry.41 Critics believe that the facts surrounding the passage of
the 2005 amendments support the conclusion that this amendment was snuck
into a larger education reform bill.42 Specifically, the section which proposed
the change to § 523(a)(8) was just seven lines amidst a vast multi-hundredpage bill.43 In addition, in all of the dissenting opinions given in response to
the proposed 2005 changes, there was not a single mention of the change to
§ 523(a)(8).44 This lack of concern is especially peculiar because there were
multiple House members who expressed their dissenting opinions on the
non-dischargeability of private student loan debts in the House Judiciary
36

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
See Kayla Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, TIME BUS. (Feb. 9,
2012), http://business.time.com/2012/02/09/why-cant-you-discharge-student-loans-in-bankruptcy/.
38 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005).
39 Larry Levinson & Denise Cariello, Senator Durbin Introduces Two Student Lending Bills, EDUC.
INDUSTRY REP. (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.educationindustryreporter.com/2013/02/senator-durbin-introducestwo-student-lending-bills/.
40 Id. (“In fact, the private student loan market had been growing—even before this measure was enacted
into law.”).
41 Id.
42 See id.; see also Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181 (“This change did not meet with any objections
from lawmakers, even from the House members who expressed dissenting views to accompany the House
Judiciary Committee’s report on the 2005 amendments.”).
43 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220,
119 Stat. 23, 59.
44 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181.
37
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Committee’s report on the amendments.45 Thus, it is clear that Congress has
failed to act consciously and constructively on student loan exemption since
the act’s passage in 1976. This Comment will argue that this failure to address
the student loan exemption has negatively impacted the American economy
and needs to be addressed.
B. Case Law Background
Currently under the Code, private student loan debts cannot be discharged
unless the debtor can show that the exemption from discharge would create an
“undue hardship” on the debtor or his dependents.46 Courts have differed in
their approach to interpreting what constitutes an “undue hardship” for a debtor
under § 523(a)(8) over time.47
In 1979, the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
attempted to define “undue hardship” in In re Johnson.48 The court outlined a
three-part test for establishing an “undue hardship.”49 The first prong of the test
asked if the income of the debtor was sufficient to allow the debtor to repay the
loans and also support himself and any dependents at a “subsistence or poverty
standard of living.”50 The second prong was a good faith test, and the third was
a policy consideration, determining if allowing the discharge of the student
debt would conflict with the purpose of Congress in specifically exempting
these debts from discharge under § 523(a)(8).51 The Pennsylvania bankruptcy
court re-visited and clarified this test in 1987 in In re Bryant.52 In Bryant, the
court elaborated on the first prong of the test from Johnson so that courts
would now use data on the federal poverty level in the debtor’s area to
establish the “subsistence or poverty standard of living” standard.53
Federal Circuit Courts took on the task of establishing an “undue hardship”
test in the 1987 case Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services
Corp.54 In Brunner, the Second Circuit established a new three-prong test for

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

See id.
See Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra note 37.
Campbell, supra note 11.
See No. 77-2033 TT, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–62 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979).
See id.
Id. at *60.
See id. at *60–61.
See Campbell, supra note 11.
See In re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
See 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
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determining “undue hardship.”55 The Brunner Test specifies that an “undue
hardship” exists when it is found that: 1) the debtor’s current financial
circumstances would not allow the debtor to subsist and repay his student loan;
2) additional circumstances exist that would make it likely that the financial
distress of the debtor would continue for a majority of the repayment period;
and 3) the debtor has acted in good faith while trying to repay the loan.56 The
Brunner Test was later adopted by many federal district courts and bankruptcy
courts57 as well as the Seventh Circuit,58 the Sixth Circuit,59 and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.60
Regardless of the name of the test used, when deciding if an “undue
hardship” exists, courts look primarily to the economic prospects of the debtor
and whether any conduct of the debtor would disqualify him from discharging
the student loan.61 Even though the current bankruptcy scheme technically
allows for the discharge of student loans in certain situations, the burden that a
debtor must meet to prove an “undue hardship” under any test is extremely
high and therefore rarely applies.62 Also, because the Code never actually
defines “undue hardship,” many scholars have argued that cases involving the
discharge of student loans often produce unfair and inconsistent results
because judges do not have an objective standard to rely on.63 This lack of a
clear and cohesive standard, in addition to Congressional tightening of rules
and standards in the Code, has created an untenable situation for those
individuals in desperate need of relief from student loan debt.
II. ANALYSIS
Even if the “undue hardship” standard was applied evenly, it still places
such a large burden on debtors that student loans are rarely discharged.64 The
55

See Campbell, supra note 11.
See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
57 See Campbell, supra note 11.
58 See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
59 See Cheesman v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1994).
60 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305–06 (3d Cir. 1995).
61 See Campbell, supra note 11.
62 See Gobel, supra note 9 (“It is incredibly hard to get student loans discharged in bankruptcy . . . .”).
63 See, e.g., Edward Paul Canterbury, The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy: A Debtor’s Guide
to Obtaining Relief, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 149, 149 (2006) (“[The undue hardship standard] has produced
unpredictable and unfair results due to Congress’ failure to adequately define the contours of the standard.”).
64 See Josh Mitchell, Harkin Opens Door to Bankruptcy Options for Student Loans, WALL ST. J. (June
25, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/06/25/harkin-opens-door-to-bankruptcy-optionfor-student-loans/.
56
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result is that many debtors are unable to achieve the “fresh start,” which is one
of the primary goals of the American bankruptcy system.65 In addition to
preventing individuals from realizing a fresh start, this student loan exemption
from discharge skews the incentives of private lenders, allowing them to lend
near infinite amounts without worrying about a borrower’s ability to repay.66
In other words, this Comment will argue that the Code’s exemption of private
student loans from discharge creates artificial incentives for private lenders to
lend beyond the socially optimum level. Some of these negative effects may be
arguably worth tolerating if there were an overriding policy consideration
requiring private student debts to be non-dischargeable, yet no such evidence
seems to exist. Thus, in order to improve the efficiency of our bankruptcy
system and economy, § 523(a)(8) of the Code should be changed back to its
pre-2005 form where private student loans were not exempt from discharge.
A. Why Not All Student Loans?
Before going further, it is worth exploring why only private student loans
should be allowed to be discharged in bankruptcy. That is, why not allow for
the discharge of federal student loans? After all, the 1976 Bankruptcy Code
amendment exempting federal student loans from discharge, like the 2005
amendments, passed despite a lack of evidence of any real policy threats.67
This question has many answers, but perhaps the most important is that
allowing full discharge of all federal student loans would prevent the
government from collecting roughly one trillion dollars in a time of high
national debt levels.68 Legislators are concerned that, in today’s uncertain
economic climate, allowing federal student loan holders to discharge their
debts could cause the educational financial aid program to become insolvent,
effectively ending necessary federal student loans.69
65 See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible
Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2234,
2268 (1997) (“[B]ankruptcy does have certain normative policy objectives distinct from those of state
collection law. Not the least of these, in a consumer bankruptcy case, is the fresh start for a financially
beleaguered debtor.”).
66 See Webley, Is Forgiving Student Loan Debt a Good Idea?, supra note 12.
67 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181.
68 See Denhart, supra note 7 (explaining that in addition to maintaining the solvency of the federal loan
program, federal student loans have lending caps and protections built into them that allow debtors other
avenues of relief besides declaring bankruptcy).
69 See Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra note 37 (“The
government is the backer on those loans (and therefore would be out of cash).”); see also Josh O’Connor,
Make Student Loan Debt Dischargeable in Bankruptcy . . . Again, NAT’L BANKR. FORUM (Feb. 28, 2014),
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In addition to preventing the federal loan program from becoming
insolvent, federal student loans have lending caps per student, while private
student loans do not.70 With no lending limits, students who take private loans
are able to pay whatever price a university may set for tuition, as opposed to
borrowers with federal loans who cannot borrow more than $57,500 for their
undergraduate education.71 If students were only able to access federal loans,
the federal loan cap would help limit tuition costs because schools could not
raise tuition beyond that $57,500 level without facing major opposition from
students receiving federal loans. As a result, universities would be forced to
keep tuition fairly affordable. However, these limitless student loans from
private third parties reduce opposition over tuition hikes because students with
private loans are able to pay whatever rate a school sets.72 This results in
universities being able to easily raise their tuitions year after year without
significant pushback, as demonstrated by the astonishing rate of tuition
increases since the 2005 amendments.73
Finally, federal student loans have regulations and protections built into
them that private student loans do not.74 Unlike with private student loans,
debtors with federal student loans have options other than discharge to
alleviate themselves of their student debt.75 For example, debtors with federal
student loans can choose an Income Based Repayment plan, in which they are
required to make monthly payments of only 10% of their monthly
discretionary income.76 After twenty-five years of such payments, regardless of
if the debtor has paid off the full balance, the remainder of the debtor’s student
loan debts are forgiven.77 Private student loans, however, are largely
http://www.natlbankruptcy.com/make-student-loan-debt-dischargeable-in-bankruptcyagain/ (“[P]roponents of
reform [paint] bleak scenarios about federal educational aid drying up if the discharge status quo carried the
day.”).
70 See Schemo, supra note 13.
71 How Much Can I Borrow?, OFF. FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/subsidizedunsubsidized#how-much (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
72 See Ivar Berg, The Effects of Inflation on and in Higher Education, 456 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 99, 108–09 (1981) (“[T]hese ‘off-budget’ programs are indeed inflationary, a prospect that did not
phase academics who breathed a sigh of relief when they raised tuition rates in confidence that students’ and
parents’ opposition to rate increases would be reduced in proportion to the growing availability of low interest
loans.”).
73 See Trends in College Pricing, supra note 4.
74 See Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra note 37.
75 See id. (“Federal loans have a lot of options for repayment such as Income Based Repayment and loan
forgiveness programs that give borrowers more realistic options for repayment and a way out.”).
76 See Income-Based Repayment (IBR), IBRINFO, http://www.ibrinfo.org/what.vp.html#IBR (last visited
Dec. 30, 2015).
77 Id.
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unregulated and have no such requirement for an Income Based Repayment
plan.78 Those with private student loans, however, often have no way to
manage their debt besides full repayment on the creditor’s terms, and thus,
need discharge as an alternative form of relief.79
B. Guaranteeing a Fresh Start
The lack of options available to debtors with private student loans not only
seems unfair on a personal level, but actually undermines the goals of the
United States’ bankruptcy system.80 One of the bankruptcy system’s main
goals is to ensure that debtors are able to be economically productive again
after declaring bankruptcy, or in other words, to give debtors an economic
“fresh start.”81 In the landmark case Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, the Supreme
Court designated the fresh start as a fundamental policy of bankruptcy,
reasoning that if no fresh start were guaranteed, then debtors who go through
the bankruptcy process would have reduced incentives to work after exiting
bankruptcy. Specifically they stated:
From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference
between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.
Pauperism may be the necessary result of either . . . . The new
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the
purpose of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor,
would be of little value to the wage earner if he were obliged to face
the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his
earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of
indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy.82

In other words, a wage earner who still has his pre-bankruptcy debts has no
incentive to work versus doing nothing, because both choices will result in
zero new income to that individual (assuming that the individual must devote

78

See Schemo, supra note 13.
See Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra note 37 (“Basically, the
only option with private loans is to repay them—and to repay them on the lender’s timetable.”).
80 See, e.g., Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 65 (“[B]ankruptcy does have certain normative policy
objectives distinct from those of state collection law. Not the least of these, in a consumer bankruptcy case, is
the fresh start for a financially beleaguered debtor.”).
81 See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
51, 53 (2002) (“The fresh start policy prevents pauperism and idleness. . . . The fresh start policy and the
existence of the reorganization process . . . are the major examples of bankruptcy law provisions that revive
productivity.”).
82 Id. at 58.
79
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all of his income to paying his debts).83 Even if the individual does not have to
devote all of his income to paying off his debts, the payments he must make to
creditors will in effect act as a wage reduction, which leads to a reduction in
that individual’s supply of labor under normal assumptions.84 As a result,
debtors who are not given a real fresh start after going through the bankruptcy
process can be expected to be less productive, and thus prevent our economy
from reaching its maximum efficiency.85
In addition to the economic argument for why private student loan debtors
should be given a fresh start, there is also a public policy concern. Specifically,
it is the goal of any legal system to aim for equitable application of the law to
ensure predictability of outcomes.86 In its current state, the Code does not seem
to give equitable treatment to similar forms of consumer debt.87 Even though
multiple types of consumer debts are dischargeable under bankruptcy law,
student loans for some reason are not. One author lamented about student loan
debt that, “[i]t’s actually worse than a bad mortgage.”88 Many people think that
student loans function like any other type of loan in bankruptcy, only to end up
“stuck in purgatory their entire life, just because they made a mistake and
borrowed too much money.”89 The long-term consequences of over-borrowing
for higher education seem to be completely out of sync with the consequences
of other consumer debts which can be discharged in bankruptcy, despite the
debtors in both situations engaging in virtually the same behavior. In fact, a
student who borrowed to pay tuition and improve her life seems less culpable
than someone who, say, ran up charges on his or her credit card, though the
Code exempts the former from discharge rather than the latter.90 Thus, the

83

See id.
See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARVARD L. REV. 1393
(1985); Albert Rees, An Overview of the Labor-Supply Results, 9 J. HUM. RESOURCES 158, 159 fig.1 (1974).
85 See Jackson, supra note 84.
86 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[S]uch alternative governing
authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs.”).
87 See Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra note 37 (“[I]t would
offer an option for students to get rid of debt that, at its core, is not really any different from other types of debt
that the government does allow borrowers to discharge.”).
88 Sarah Lacey, Peter Thiel: We’re in a Bubble and It’s Not the Internet. It’s Higher Education., TECH
CRUNCH (Apr. 10, 2011) (quotation marks omitted), http://techcrunch.com/2011/04/10/peter-thiel-were-in-abubble-and-its-not-the-internet-its-higher-education/.
89 Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra note 37.
90 See Tyler Kingkade, Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Rule Traps Graduates with Debt Amid Calls for
Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 9:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/
private-student-loans-bankruptcy-law_n_1753462.html (“‘There’s no reason why private student loans should
be treated differently than gambling debt,’ when it comes to bankruptcy eligibility.”).
84
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incongruence between the treatments of these similar forms of debt not only
harms the individual debtor with student loans, but deteriorates the equality
and predictability of our bankruptcy system.
C. Economic Benefits of Allowing Discharge
Allowing the discharge of private student loan debts in bankruptcy would
have much broader effects than simply giving debtors a fresh start after
bankruptcy proceedings. Specifically, allowing discharge of private student
loans in bankruptcy would address both the problem of the higher education
degree bubble as well as the nation’s rising student debt.
1. The Higher Education Degree Bubble
When people talk about financial or economic bubbles, they are typically
referring to a rapid increase in price of some sort of financial asset, such as
stocks, commodities, or real estate.91 The term “bubble” more generally refers
to a rapid increase in price for any asset “to levels significantly above the
fundamental value of that asset.”92 In other words, a bubble occurs when the
perceived value of a good increases beyond its real value, regardless of what
that good is.93 Since 1985, the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) has risen 115%,
while the cost of college education has increased 500%.94 To put this into
perspective, a $10,000 tuition in 1986 would now cost the same student over
$21,500, if tuition increased at the same rate of inflation; instead, it would
actually cost that student $59,800 for tuition today because of inflation.95 The
cost of tuition has increased so quickly that between 2003 and 2013 the CPI for
tuition rose 79.5%, while necessities such as housing increased only 22.8%,
and men’s and women’s clothing increased 6.9% and 5.6%, respectively.96
Even though tuition has been increasing at astonishing rates, a bubble does
not occur until the price increases significantly beyond the fundamental value
91 See Economic Bubble Definition, NASDAQ GLOSSARY, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/e/
economic-bubble (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (“A market phenomenon characterized by surges in asset prices
to levels significantly above the fundamental value of that asset.”).
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Steve Odland, College Costs Out of Control, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/steveodland/2012/03/24/college-costs-are-soaring/.
95 Id.
96 Danielle Kurtzleben, CHARTS: Just How Fast Has College Tuition Grown?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:56 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/23/charts-just-how-fast-hascollege-tuition-grown.
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of the good.97 This brings into question then the fundamental value of a college
degree. What benefits do individuals gain by obtaining a college diploma?
Although people may argue that various immeasurable mental and emotional
benefits are derived from higher education, from an economic perspective, a
rational individual would only choose to attend college if he or she believed
that the future benefits were greater than the costs incurred by attending.98 This
economic reasoning is just another way to state the traditional “American
dream” ideal that students attend college to get better jobs in hopes of earning
more money over their lifetime than if they had not attended. Thus, if the net
amount of money that college graduates earn is increasing compared to those
who do not attend college, then the rapid increase in college tuition seen in the
past years could arguably be justified. Unfortunately, the question of whether
college actually increases one’s lifetime earnings is a difficult one to answer.
Whether college is a profitable investment for an individual depends on
many factors.99 College major plays a large role in how much a college degree
returns on investment.100 One study conducted by the research firm PayScale
gathered data from over 900 colleges and universities in order to determine the
twenty-year return of different college degrees.101 The study found that after
taking the cost of education into account, an engineering degree from
University of California Berkley would make a student on average $1.1 million
better off over a twenty-year span as compared to a high school diploma.102
Even the least profitable university engineering degree would be expected to
have a twenty-year return of near $500,000 over the average high school
diploma alone.103 Economics and Computer Science degrees similarly
averaged a twenty-year ROI between $362,600 to $1.109 million and $304,000
to $1.6 million, respectively.104 Thus, for certain fields of study it seems that
continuing education past high school is almost always a sound investment,
even with rising tuition rates.
97

See Economic Bubble Definition, supra note 91.
See Rational Choice Theory Definition, INVESTOPEDIA DICTIONARY, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/rational-choice-theory.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
99 See, e.g., Is College Worth It?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/unitedstates/21600131-too-many-degrees-are-waste-money-return-higher-education-would-be-much-better.
100 See id.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 Best Value Colleges for Economics Majors, PAYSCALE, http://www.payscale.com/college-roi/major/
economics (last visited Dec. 29, 2015); Best Value Colleges for Computer Science Majors, PAYSCALE,
http://www.payscale.com/college-roi/major/computer-science (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
98
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The picture becomes much less clear when discussing majors such as
Humanities and English, Education, or the Arts though. For example, the
PayScale study reports that a “Humanities” major from University of
California Berkeley can expect a twenty year ROI of $463,100 for an in-state
student, which is clearly a substantial return on one’s investment.105 On the
other end of the spectrum, however, Humanities majors from Bowling Green
State University on average actually realize a negative twenty year return on
investment of $207,100 for in-state students after paying off the expenses for
their education.106 The large gap seen between the return on investment for
graduates within the same majors shows the second variable affecting the value
of a college education: quality of the school. No matter the major, students
attending one of the highest-rated universities can expect a return on
investment in the hundreds of thousands of dollars according to this study.107
Though as the numbers show, our society’s vision of college as a guaranteed
way to improve your lifetime earnings is not true for all students.108
The result of this frequent exaggeration of a college education’s financial
benefits is that people end up taking on significant debt based on the societal
promise of a large payday, only to find that there is no such guarantee.109
Deemed “a million-dollar misunderstanding”110 by some, these estimates have
driven this higher education bubble, inducing students to attend college despite
skyrocketing tuition costs and graduate salaries staying stagnate for most of the
past decade.111 The result is many individuals are prevented from
economically-productive activities, such as buying houses, starting businesses,
or investing their money, which in turn harms the overall economy.112
2. Over Access to Credit Driving Up Tuition
To correct this bubble and the harmful effects that it brings, the price of
education needs to be returned to the actual value of a college education.113
105 See Best Value Colleges for Humanities Majors, PAYSCALE, http://www.payscale.com/college-roi/
major/humanities? (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See Mary Pilon, What’s a Degree Really Worth?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703822404575019082819966538.
110 Id. (calling the perception that college is exponentially beneficial “a million-dollar misunderstanding”)
(quotation marks omitted).
111 See Is College Worth It?, supra note 99.
112 See id.
113 See Economic Bubble Definition, supra note 91.
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One culpable mechanism for driving up tuition costs is private lenders who
grant students easy access to borrowing, and in doing so, remove the incentive
for universities to keep tuition down.114 Section 523(a)(8) of the Code gives
private educational lenders the same protection from discharge as non-profit
lenders, even though private companies have no limit on the amount they can
lend.115 The combination of these two circumstances creates a situation where
private lenders need not worry about whether a borrower’s education is going
to be sufficiently valuable to pay off the loan because the debt cannot be
discharged if the borrower files for bankruptcy.116 As a result, lenders have an
incentive to give vast sums of money to students because the Code requires
that these debts must be repaid.117
Universities have capitalized on the trend of unlimited lending to
students.118 Without private lenders pumping limitless amounts of loans into
the education market, as with any other good, universities would be forced to
limit their tuition hikes with too high of prices turning away students who
cannot attend.119 Private student lenders who are willing and able to lend any
amount that a university may charge reduce this threat of students not
attending because of an inability to pay.120 Because of these lenders’ policies,
universities can continue to raise tuition without seeing a significantly large
drop in the number of enrolled students, allowing tuition prices to rise well
above the actual value of the education.121

114

See Webley, Is Forgiving Student Loan Debt a Good Idea?, supra note 12.
See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181 (“By virtue of [the] legislation, for-profit lenders have been
extended the special treatment that had been traditionally reserved for educational and nonprofit
institutions. . . . Without limits on the amount students can borrow, without programs to reduce or defer
payments, and without caps on interest rates, students can quickly find themselves deeply mired in debt.”).
116 See Webley, Is Forgiving Student Loan Debt a Good Idea?, supra note 12 (“Virtually everyone who
applies is approved for almost unlimited student loans, regardless of how likely they are to be able to pay them
back.”).
117 See id. (“But lenders aren’t really concerned about [students’ ability to repay] because student loans
cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. [Lenders] know they’ll get their money back one way or another.”).
118 See id.
119 See Gross Profit Margin and Markup, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 23, 2000), http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/21936.
120 See Webley, Is Forgiving Student Loan Debt a Good Idea?, supra note 12 (“And further, colleges have
no incentive to keep tuition low . . . because whether they can afford it or not, students will find a way to pay
the bill.”).
121 See id.
115
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The climbing trend can be seen in tuition rates over the past few decades,
with private lenders contributing to the skyrocketing rates of tuition.122 Some
increases in prices are expected for goods over time due to inflation, but tuition
has been increasing at rates far ahead of almost any other good.123 Since 1985,
tuition rates in the United States have increased roughly 500%, while the
Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) has increased only 115%.124 Clearly factors
besides simple inflation are accounting for the increased tuition rates with the
over-availability of third party funds being a probable cause.125
A similar phenomenon has been seen in medical care costs, which have
increased 43.1% between 2003 and 2013, nearly doubling the growth of the
CPI over that period.126 Like with private student loans contributing to rising
tuition, observers have pointed to the easy availability of third and fourth-party
insurance funds as the cause of the rising health care costs.127 Because so many
individuals do not pay for their health care directly, they are not as responsive
to the cost and value of the care that they receive.128 If people were forced to
pay healthcare costs out of pocket, instead of a third party paying for them,
people may be “quite willing to accept health care from the ‘second-tier,’ but
reputable, hospital if it meant that [they] could save 30 percent on [their]
premiums.”129 Overpriced hospitals would eventually notice this price signal
and realize that individuals are not willing to pay such high prices for medical
treatment, and in turn, they would lower their prices, as has been seen in other
industries.130

122 See Rising Cost of College Tuition and the Effectiveness of Government Financial Aid: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 106th Cong. 28 (2000) (statement of David W. Breneman, Dean, Curry School
of Education, University of Virginia) (“Federal loan programs are capped, but you have a multitude of private
loan programs . . . and it is hard for me to believe, frankly, that somehow this has not played into some aspect
of tuition increases.”).
123 See Kurtzleben, supra note 96.
124 Odland, supra note 94.
125 See Rising Cost of College Tuition, supra note 122 (“Federal loan programs are capped, but you have a
multitude of private loan programs . . . and it is hard for me to believe, frankly, that somehow this has not
played into some aspect of tuition increases.”).
126 Kurtzleben, supra note 96.
127 See Avik Roy, How Employer-Sponsored Insurance Drives Up Health Costs, FORBES (May 12, 2012,
12:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/05/12/how-employer-sponsored-insurance-drives-uphealth-costs/.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id. (“[A]irlines consistently find that consumers prefer lower fares to cost-inefficient, and tasteless,
airplane food. No such price signal exists in the employer-sponsored insurance market.”).
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This same basic reasoning can be applied to students paying for college
with private student loans. Because they are not paying the cost of tuition out
of pocket, and instead are borrowing from private lenders with near limitless
amounts of funds, individuals have less incentive to fight against rising tuition
by “voting with their feet” and attending other institutions.131 As with hospital
choice, people would likely be “quite willing” to attend a slightly less
reputable university with a much lower price tag if they had to pay out of
pocket. As it stands now, however, because private lenders are willing to lend
whatever a university may charge, students do not have to make this decision,
and therefore, universities do not receive the signal that their services are
overpriced.
At least with third party insurance, the rising costs in medical care can be
justified by the benefits given to individuals. The benefit to third party
insurance is that individuals are able to receive more coverage than they would
if they had to purchase insurance themselves.132 Thus, the benefits gained from
the third party insurance program could arguably justify the increased medical
costs that they cause. As discussed in the Background section, there is no
corresponding policy interest for the passage of the 2005 amendments to the
Code that can justify the negative results of this law.133 Instead, the exemption
of private student loans from discharge seems to be the result of a “sweetheart
deal” that has had disastrous effects and needs to be repealed.134
D. Protections Against Abuse
One of the most common reasons legislators give for excluding student
loans from discharge is the need to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system.135
131 See id. (describing how borrowing money from a third party causes many individuals to become
insensitive to price changes) (“If you bought insurance for yourself, you might be quite willing to accept health
care from the ‘second-tier,’ but reputable, hospital if it meant that you could save 30 percent on your
premiums.”).
132 See id. (“[A] worker who pays federal and state income taxes at a combined rate of 30% will receive
$7,000 for every $10,000 his employer provides in gross salary. But the same employee will receive $10,000
in benefits for every $10,000 his employer spends on health insurance—a 43% improvement.”).
133 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181.
134 Levinson & Cariello, supra note 39.
135 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 180–81 (“Congress took this action [of exempting student loans
from discharge] on the basis of perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system by student-loan debtors . . . .”);
Kingkade, Private Student Loan Bankruptcy, supra note 90 (“This harsh treatment of students in the
bankruptcy system was built on the false premise that students were more likely to ‘abuse’ the bankruptcy
system . . . .”); Campbell, supra note 11 (“The legislation was a response to a rapid increase in the number of
bankruptcies filed by recent graduates of college or professional schools who were not in financial distress
generally and who filed for bankruptcy in order to discharge their student loans shortly after graduating.”).
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The 1976 Bankruptcy Code included a five-year waiting period before student
debts could be discharged because lawmakers were skeptical of new graduates
discharging their debts while they still had few assets and then going on to
more lucrative careers.136 As stated earlier though, this fear of post-graduate
abuse was baseless when the provisions were put into effect because, even
then, student debt abuses accounted for less than 1% of all filings, and this fear
remains baseless today.137 Even if abuse of the bankruptcy system posed as
large a threat as legislatures believe, existing anti-abuse measures can
sufficiently curb abuse without having to resort to the harsh measure of
exempting private student loans from discharge.138
Currently, the Code has independent abuse provisions, most notably the
means test in § 707(b), which sets an objective and straightforward standard
for a judge to detect and prevent abuse of the system.139 Also, even if an
individual’s filing passes the means test, a court can still dismiss the case if it
finds that the filing was made in “bad faith,” or if “the totality of the
circumstances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.”140 In
addition, many student loans by private lenders today require a co-signing
party to help ensure that the bank is secured in the event of abuse.141 Together
these protections effectively safeguard against abuse in the bankruptcy system,
which this Comment will argue makes the exemption of student loans
unnecessary.
1. The Code’s Anti-Abuse Provisions
Section 707 of the Code states that after notice and hearing, a court may
dismiss a chapter 7 case, or convert it to a chapter 11 or 13 case, if it finds that

136

See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Upon graduation,
the typical student has little or no non-exempt property that can be distributed to creditors, but may have
substantial future earning potential. Section 523(a)(8) was designed to remove the temptation of recent
graduates to use the bankruptcy system as a low-cost method of unencumbering future earnings.”).
137 See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 19, at 181 (“Simply put, the discharge of student loans in bankruptcy
was too minor to threaten the economic viability of the student-loan program.”).
138 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2012).
139 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
140 Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only
Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 666 (2005) (quotation marks omitted).
141 See Susan Tompor, Cosigning a Student Loan Risky for Parents, USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2014, 7:01
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/tompor/2014/08/24/susan-tompor-cosigning-a-student-loanrisky-for-parents/14501901/ (“About 90% of private student loans . . . were cosigned in 2011, according to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.”).
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the granting of relief would be an abuse of the Code.142 Courts usually do not
convert individual chapter 7 filings to chapter 11; so, where courts find a filing
has abused the system, the court will often use a § 707 action to dismiss the
case or convert it to a chapter 13.143 From an anti-abuse standpoint, chapter 13
bankruptcies are preferable to chapter 7 for can-pay debtors because chapter 13
requires that a debtor stick to a three- to five-year payment plan to pay off his
debts, whereas chapter 7 discharges his debts.144
One way that a court determines whether a filing constitutes an abuse is by
applying the means test articulated in § 707(b)(2).145 Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i)
explains that there is a presumption of abuse when a debtor’s monthly income
multiplied by sixty is greater than or equal to: (1) the larger of $7475 or 25%
of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or (2) $12,475.146
Calculating a debtor’s monthly income under § 707(b)(2) is done by averaging
the debtor’s monthly income for the six month period preceding the petition
date.147 Once the debtor’s monthly average income is determined, the court
compares it to the monthly average income for individuals of the same
household size in the state in which the debtor resides.148 If the debtor’s
monthly average income is found to be above median (that is, if the debtor fails
the means test), then § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) states that the debtor may deduct
monthly allowable expenses from his or her monthly average income to see if
she can meet the standards of the means test.149 Deductions are allowed for
obligations such as health and disability insurance,150 the cost to care for a
chronically ill household member,151 and allowances for housing and

142

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS, (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/FederalCourts/BankruptcyResources/bankbasics.pdf (“Unless the debtor overcomes the presumption
of abuse, the case will generally be converted to chapter 13 (with the debtor’s consent) or will be dismissed.”).
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (“The plan— [] shall provide for the submission of all or such portion of
future earnings or other future income of the debtor . . . .”).
145 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
146 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
147 See Culhane & White, supra note 140, at 673.
148 See id. at 674.
149 See id. at 675.
150 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“Such expenses shall include reasonably necessary health insurance,
disability insurance . . . .”).
151 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (“In addition, the debtor’s monthly expenses may include, if
applicable, the continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for care
and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household member or member of the debtor’s immediate
family . . . .”).
143
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utilities.152 These expenses are not to include any payments for debts.153 Thus,
the means test is a way to ensure that the wealthiest debtors do not abuse the
system without depriving individuals of their basic needs. If a debtor still fails
the means test after all of the allowed deductions, then he can still rebut the
presumption of abuse by making a showing of special circumstances.154
Although the means test weeds out the worst cases of abuse, very few
debtors actually fail the test.155 Only about 6–15% of individuals filing under
chapter 7 are above-median debtors, and even some above-median debtors are
able to do pre-bankruptcy restructuring to pass the means test.156 Thus, recent
graduates with few assets at the time of filing attempting to discharge their
student debts in an abusive way will almost always pass the means test; so,
another mechanism must be applied as well.157
To combat this potential problem of abusive debtors passing the means test,
courts have another mechanism for preventing abuse.158 If a debtor passes the
means test, a court may still dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy or convert it to
chapter 11 or 13 “if ‘the debtor filed the petition “in bad faith,’” or “‘the
totality of the circumstances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation
demonstrates abuse.’”159 This provision giving courts discretion to dismiss a
filing for abuse is especially important for preventing student loan abuse
because new graduates are likely to have very few assets, and thus will qualify
as below-median debtors.160
152 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V) (“[T]he debtor’s monthly expenses may include an allowance for
housing and utilities.”).
153 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“[T]he monthly expenses of the debtor shall not include any payments
for debts.”).
154 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (citing examples including “serious medical condition or a call or
order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances that justify additional
expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative”).
155 See Culhane & White, supra note 140, at 665 (“Since 1999, however, Congress has had reason to
expect more than 95% of chapter 7 filers to pass the [means] test.”).
156 See id. at 674 (“Debtors could possibly manipulate outcomes by reducing income, moving to a
higher-median state, or increasing household size.”).
157 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
158 See Culhane & White, supra note 140, at 665–66 (“Debtors who pass the means test still face judicial
scrutiny and dismissal for ‘abuse of the provisions of [chapter 7]’. . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a), 119 Stat.
23, 27–32 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2012))).
159 Id. at 666.
160 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Upon graduation,
the typical student has little or no non-exempt property that can be distributed to creditors, but may have
substantial future earning potential. Section 523(a)(8) was designed to remove the temptation of recent
graduates to use the bankruptcy system as a low-cost method of unencumbering future earnings.”).
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The “good faith” requirement is typically used to limit abusive actions such
as repeat filings and blatant non-cooperation by debtors, although its scope
could potentially be widened to prevent abuse by student loan debtors.161 The
Sixth Circuit showed how the “good faith” requirement can encompass student
loan abuses in In re Cheesman.162 The court found that the debtors did not
violate the “good faith” requirement because they did not file for bankruptcy
immediately before their debts becoming due, had been making payments on
their loans for years, and held “worthwhile jobs.”163 Most importantly, the
court found “[t]here [was] no indication that they were attempting to abuse the
student loan system by having their loans forgiven before embarking on
lucrative careers . . . .”164
The Tenth Circuit gave another explanation of “bad faith” filings in Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, holding that when determining whether a
debtor filed in good faith, the inquiry should focus on “the legitimacy of the
basis for seeking a discharge.”165
Under either explanation given by the courts, the “good faith” requirement
would prevent a debtor from trying to discharge student loan debts upon
graduation simply to unencumber future earnings. Under the Tenth Circuit’s
definition focusing on legitimacy, one can assume that a student filing for
bankruptcy simply to increase his or her future earnings would be dismissed or
converted quite easily for a showing of “bad faith.”166 The Sixth Circuit’s
definition explicitly mentions that graduates attempting to discharge their loans
before heading off on a lucrative career will be dismissed for bad faith,
showing that courts are able to prevent student loan abuse without having to
exempt all private student loans from discharge.167

161

See Culhane & White, supra note 140, at 668.
See 25 F.3d 356, 359–60 (6th Cir. 1994).
163 Id. at 360 (“The Cheesmans made minimal payments on their loans several years after their loans
became due and at least a year before filing for bankruptcy. Furthermore, the Cheesmans chose to work in
worthwhile, albeit low-paying, professions.”).
164 Id.
165 356 F.3d at 1310 (“For instance, a debtor who willfully contrives a hardship in order to discharge
student loans should be deemed to be acting in bad faith. Good faith, however, should not be used as a means
for courts to impose their own values on a debtor’s life choices.”).
166 See, e.g., Stewart v. U.S. Trustee (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing a doctor
being sued and going through an expensive divorce who filed for bankruptcy in bad faith).
167 See Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 360 (“There is no indication that they were attempting to abuse the student
loan system by having their loans forgiven before embarking on lucrative careers in the private sector.”).
162
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Another tool used by courts to help prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system
is a broader test found in § 707(b)(3)(B) that allows a judge to dismiss a
chapter 7 case if the “the totality of the circumstances . . . of the debtor’s
financial situation demonstrates abuse.”168 This test is broader than the means
test because it takes into account the debtor’s current ability to repay, as well
as his projected disposable income.169 The Tenth Circuit laid out a list of
factors in In re Mondragon, which it used to weigh the totality of the
circumstances when looking for abuse.170 These factors are:
(1) [T]he debtor’s ability to repay his or her debts; (2) whether the
debtor has a stable source of future income; (3) whether the debtor’s
expenses can be reduced without depriving the debtor of adequate
food, clothing, shelter and other necessities; (4) whether the debtor
has suffered a sudden illness or calamity; (5) whether the debtor has
obtained cash advances and consumer purchases far in excess of the
debtor’s ability to repay; (6) whether the debtor has excessive
expenses; (7) whether the debtor has provided accurate and complete
information on his or her statements and schedules; and (8) whether
the debtor has acted in good faith.171

Although not all courts follow this exact set of criteria, it shows that
bankruptcy courts are concerned about the debtor’s projected ability to
repay.172 Thus, students graduating and trying to discharge their student loan
debts before moving on to a profitable job would almost certainly have their
cases dismissed or converted to a chapter 13 case under both the totality of the
circumstances test and the good faith test.
2. Student Loan Cosigners
The provisions in the Code that prevent abuse are not the only protection
that lenders have against students walking away from educational loans.173 The
recent trend in the private student loan market requiring cosigners for student
168 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (2012); see also Culhane & White, supra note 140, at 668 (“Totality of the
circumstances has a broader scope . . . .”).
169 See In re Mondragon, No. 7-06-10665 MR, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2894, at *9–11 (Bankr. D.N.M.
Aug. 24, 2007); see also In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
170 See 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2894, at *5.
171 Id.
172 See Henebury, 361 B.R. at 609 (“Post-BAPCPA, other bankruptcy courts have held that abuse
determinations pursuant to the totality of the circumstances of the debtors financial situation requires analysis
of a debtor’s actual ability to pay and therefore post-petition events are properly considered under
§ 707(b)(3)(B).”).
173 See Tompor, supra note 141 (stating that most private student loans issued require a cosigner).
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loans provides extra assurance for lenders that they will be repaid.174 Together,
the cosignors and bankruptcy provisions provide sufficient protection to
creditors such that exempting private student loans from discharge is
unnecessary.
Cosigners on private student loans have increased in recent years, with
about 90% of the private student loans issued in 2011 having a cosigner.175
This figure is up from just 67% in 2008.176 When an individual cosigns a
student loan, he assumes the responsibility to repay the student’s debt in the
event that the student defaults on the loan.177 This means that even if the
student tries to walk away from payment, the lender can still go after the
cosigner as if he or she held the debt.178 Many times lenders will have
requirements about a cosigner’s creditworthiness in order for a borrower to
qualify to ensure that there is adequate ability to pay in the event of a default
by the student.179 The fact that nearly all private student loan debts are
cosigned gives lenders sufficient protection in the event that a student
defaults.180
In addition to protecting lenders when a student defaults, having a cosigner
also protects the lender if the student borrower declares bankruptcy.181 Even if
both the cosigner and the student declare bankruptcy, and the student is able to
discharge the debt, most courts which ruled on this issue have refused to
release the cosigner from their obligation.182 Many cases have addressed the
dischargeability of cosigners’ student loan debt, yet “[n]o reported case
appears to have held that § 523(a)(8) does not apply to an educational loan
where . . . only the parent is liable.”183 Not only can the cosigner be held solely
liable if the student stops paying, but lenders can also hold the cosigner liable
174

See id.
Id.
176 Id.
177 See id.
178 See id. (“That cosigned loan is treated as if it were the parent’s loan.”).
179 How Do I Find Student Loans if I Don’t Have a Creditworthy Cosigner?, EDVISORS (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.edvisors.com/ask/faq/student-loans-no-cosigner/.
180 See Tompor, supra note 141 (stating that roughly 90% of the private student loans issued in 2011
required a cosigner).
181 See id. (stating that even a cosigner cannot typically achieve a discharge of the student loan debt in the
event of a bankruptcy filing).
182 See Patricia Somers & James M. Hollis, Student Loan Discharge Through Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 457, 467 (1996).
183 Uterhark v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Uterhark), 185 B.R. 39, 41 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1995) (citations omitted).
175
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in a whole range of circumstances, including if the cosigner enters bankruptcy
or if the student dies.184 The reasoning given varies from case to case, but the
underlying motivation for holding cosigners liable, even though they did not
actually receive an educational benefit, is that lenders are similarly harmed
when the student or cosigner discharges the loan.185 Essentially, having a
cosigner on a loan gives lenders an assurance that they will be able to extract
payment in almost any situation, making it very difficult for students to abuse
private student loans.
E. Effects of a Bubble
1. Avoiding a Bubble Burst
The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis shocked the global economy and
resulted in years of economic hardship known as the “Great Recession.”186 The
major cause of the subprime mortgage crisis was lenient lending standards that
allowed individuals to purchase more of a home without putting any actual
equity into the investment.187 It was believed for a long time that homes were
an extremely reliable investment, and people, therefore, were willing to borrow
huge sums of money to buy houses they could not afford.188 In many people’s
minds, the worst-case scenario if they could not afford the payment would be
to sell the house at a small cost, or maybe even for a profit.189 This belief that
the particular asset was always a sound investment caused people to buy more,
thus driving up the prices of homes without actually improving the real value
184 See Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 329, 350–51 (2013) (“Private student loan lenders are not required to forgive the cosigner, and
while some may do so, other lenders demand payment even if the student borrower has died.”); Somers &
Hollis, supra note 182, at 466–67 (noting that one court has allowed discharge to a cosigner debtor but that
most courts do not allow such a discharge).
185 Somers & Hollis, supra note 182, at 467; see also Palmer v. Student Loan Fin. Corp., 153 B.R. 888,
895 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993) (finding liability because of a focus on the type of debt, instead of on the debtor).
186 See, e.g., Jamie P. Hopkins & Katherine A. Pustizzi, A Blast from the Past: Are the Robo-Signing
Issues That Plagued the Mortgage Crisis Set to Engulf the Student Loan Industry?, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 239,
242 (2014).
187 See id. (“These trends continued, with people refinancing more, buying more, owning less, and having
bigger interest payments.”).
188 See, e.g., id. at 241 (“[H]omeownership is widely recognized as a stable investment.”).
189 See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting Credit
Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 125–26 (2009) (“Irrational exuberance played a key
role in the housing bubble, as with all bubbles, when all parties involved in creating the housing bubble
became convinced that home prices would continue to rise. . . . Home buyers continued to purchase homes
(often for speculative purposes) even though the monthly payments would eventually prove unmanageable.
They assumed that they would be able to ‘flip’ the home for a profit . . . .”).
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of the asset.190 Eventually the prices of homes became so far out of sync with
the actual value of the real estate that the market collapsed, and people found
themselves underwater on their mortgages.191
As a result of the loose lending standards that allowed individuals to
purchase expensive homes with little equity, the 2007 drop in housing prices
“spread the flame of contagion and crisis.”192 By 2010, more than 25% of all
U.S. mortgage holders owed more on their mortgages than their homes were
worth.193 The reduction in the price of an asset as important as a house led to
many people losing one of their largest investments, and thus, a large chunk of
their overall wealth.194 The reduced housing prices alone would have created
quite a large financial shock, but because many individuals owed more on their
homes than they were worth, foreclosures and mortgage defaults greatly
increased.195 As more and more people began foreclosing and defaulting,
banks and lenders began to realize that lending was riskier than they had
originally anticipated and responded by freezing lines of credit across the
nation.196
This freezing of credit lines at a time when individuals’ wealth had been
largely wiped out led to a serious reduction in real productivity.197 When an
individual experiences a reduction in wealth, typically he can rely on credit to
continue to make purchases until his wealth builds up enough to pay off the
credit charges, ensuring that individual has a constant level of consumption
through economic hardship.198 Freezing lines of credit concurrently with a drop
190 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 241–42 (“[H]omeownership is widely recognized as a
stable investment . . . . These trends continued, with people refinancing more, buying more, owning less, and
having bigger interest payments.”).
191 See id. at 243 (“However, when housing prices fall, many people end up owing more money to their
lender than they have in either the house or their personal savings.”).
192 Id. at 242.
193 Id. at 243.
194 See Paul Solman & Elizabeth Shell, Latest U.S. Home Prices Show Your Largest Asset May be
Withering Away, PBS (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/latest-us-homeprices-show-you-1/ (“If you’re a homeowner, you’re watching the value of one of your largest assets—if not
your very largest asset—wither away.”).
195 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 241–42 (“[W]hen housing prices decrease, foreclosure and
mortgage defaults increase.”).
196 See Peter J. Montiel, On Macroeconomic Reforms and Macroeconomic Resiliency: Lessons from the
Great Recession, 2 MODERN ECON. 528, 531 (2011) (“The financial panic was followed by a collapse of real
activity as the result of reduced asset values and the freezing up of credit flows.”).
197 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 241.
198 See Jonathan Morduch, Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 104
(1995) (“Second, households can smooth consumption by borrowing and saving, depleting and accumulating
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in an individual’s wealth renders him unable to make purchases (or can only
make a limited number of purchases), and when this phenomenon occurs for
many individuals across a nation, overall economic activity declines.199 This is
exactly what happened in the wake of the 2008 housing crash, resulting in a
GDP reduction of roughly 3.7%, and unemployment rates doubled, reaching
over 10%.200 Because of the initial housing collapse, and the ensuing crisis,
more than $11 trillion in household wealth disappeared, and millions of
Americans lost their homes.201
The similarities between the subprime mortgage crisis and the student debt
bubble are striking.202 Both situations involve over-lenient lending standards,
allowing individuals to purchase assets (education and housing) while putting
less and less equity into the investment.203 These lending standards make funds
readily available, encouraging people to spend more money than they would
under normal lending standards, which in turn causes the price of the asset to
increase at astonishing rates.204 In both the pre-2008 housing and the current
student loan market, the price of the assets increased at a rate much faster than
their real value, creating a bubble.205 It follows then, that like in the subprime
mortgage crisis, when the price of the asset falls back in line with its real value,
it may spark a national and potentially worldwide crisis.
Because loose credit standards inflated both the housing and student loan
bubbles, it seems that the fallout from the student debt bubble bursting would
cause many of the same effects as the housing market crash of 2008. In both

nonfinancial assets, adjusting labor supply, and employing formal and informal insurance arrangements. These
mechanisms take force after shocks occur and help insulate consumption patterns from income variability.”).
199 See John Irons, Economic Scarring; The Long-Term Impacts of the Recession, ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE, (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp243/.
200 Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 241.
201 Id.
202 See Michael B. Fishbein, 9 Striking Similarities Between the Housing Bubble and The Higher
Education Bubble, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-bfishbein/9-striking-similarities-b_b_5062840.html.
203 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 242 (“‘In general, these kinds of loan structures permit new
homeowners to purchase a home with less capital and lower initial payments. In turn, these borrowers have
less equity in the home’ . . . . These trends continued, with people refinancing more, buying more, owning less,
and having bigger interest payments.”). See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT
LOANS, supra note 6.
204 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 241–42 (“[h]omeownership is widely recognized as a
stable investment . . . .”); Trends in College Pricing, supra note 4 (explaining that the price of higher education
has skyrocketed in this country in the past forty years, with the average cost of tuition rising approximately
204% from 1974 to 2014).
205 See Holt, supra note 189, at 120; Lacey, supra note 88.
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events, the value of the borrower’s asset (i.e., the home and the college
education) decreases substantially, leaving the borrower underwater on his or
her investment.206 Since he cannot pay off this large debt, the debtor must
discharge the money by entering into either foreclosure or bankruptcy. Both
situations give the debtor an ability to discharge the debt, but they force the
debtor to forfeit future wages or other assets and severely harm his credit
score.207 Not only will a bubble burst drastically reduce many individuals’
credit scores, but it will also lead to an increase in the amount of bankruptcy
and foreclosure filings. This increase will in turn cause borrowers to tighten
lines of credit, further limiting debtors’ ability to make purchases in their time
of reduced wages. As a result, economic activity will stall, and without credit
to jumpstart new projects and investments, recovery will be slow.208 This threat
is especially pronounced when it comes to student loan debt because recent
projections suggest that student debt default rates are expected to be
“significantly higher” than those in the pre-2008 housing industry were.209
Students, therefore, need to be able to discharge their student loan debts to
prevent the bubble from inflating to bursting levels. Hopefully, allowing
students to discharge their private student loan debt will result in a gradual
tightening of lending standards. Like with all other types of lending, if private
student loans are dischargeable in bankruptcy, lenders will have an incentive to
only grant credit to the amount that would be profitable instead of being
willing to lend infinite amounts because repayment will be guaranteed. Thus,
students will no longer have access to infinite sums of money to attend school
206 See Phil Rosenthal, Students Finding Out What It Means to Be Underwater, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 29,
2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-29/business/ct-biz-0829-phil-20120829_1_loan-debt-studentloans-rohit-chopra (“It’s bad enough millions of U.S. homes are underwater, worth less money on the real
estate market than needed to pay off the outstanding mortgage balance. The prospect of millions of Americans
dragged under by massive student loans their pricey college educations might not be able to recoup in a weak
job market could further challenge the U.S. economy.”).
207 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 243 (“Traditional mortgage foreclosure resulted in three
problems for a homeowner: (1) the loss of his or her home; (2) the loss of future wages or other assets; and (3)
a decrease in credit score.”); Stephen J. Dunn, Many Consumer Bankruptcies Do More Harm than Good,
FORBES (June 3, 2011, 8:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephendunn/2011/06/03/consumerbankruptcies-do-more-harm-than-good/ (“[T]he filing of a bankruptcy case can remain on the debtor’s credit
report for ten years.”).
208 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 241 (“‘The financial panic was followed by a collapse of
real activity as the result of reduced asset values and the freezing up of credit flows’ . . . from which it took the
U.S. markets almost five years to fully recover.”); see also Phil Rosenthal, supra note 206 (“The growing
student loan debt crisis (is seen by many) as the next potential threat to our country’s financial stability.”)
(quotation marks omitted).
209 Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 240 (“[S]tudent debt default rates [are] projected to be
significantly higher than those witnessed in the housing industry.”).
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and will instead be forced to perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine
which university is the best fit for them instead of choosing what they might
consider a slightly “better” school at a higher cost. The reduction in the amount
of money lent to students will in turn signal to universities that they cannot
keep their prices at such exorbitant levels. As a result, the amount of student
debt should eventually level off, and the education system should become
more sustainable.
2. The Issue of “Robo-Filings”
When an individual owes more on her home than it is worth, she is forced
to make a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it is better to foreclose on
the home or to continue to make payments.210 Although foreclosing may cause
a debtor to forfeit assets and harm her credit score, the lower that housing
prices drop, the more appealing foreclosure becomes because it allows the
debtor to discharge her mortgage.211 Thus, as housing prices decrease,
foreclosure and mortgage rates tend to increase.212
As foreclosures increased following the 2007 housing price drop, banks
became swamped with foreclosure proceedings.213 Due to the complicated set
of laws surrounding bringing a foreclosure proceeding, properly filing the
documents can take a very long time.214 Depending on varying state laws, a
foreclosure proceeding can potentially require that multiple affidavits and
certifications are signed by someone with personal knowledge of the bank’s
status to ensure that the bank has proper standing to proceed with the
foreclosure.215 Specifically, these documents are intended to verify facts about
the home, such as whether there are liens on the property, whether the bank
owned a mortgage on the house, or if the bank had authority to foreclose on the
property.216
210 See id. at 243 (“This tremendous drop in home values placed a high percentage of Americans
‘underwater,’ forcing a strategic decision: Is it better to foreclose on a home if you owe more than it is
worth?”).
211 See id.
212 Id.
213 See id. at 239 (“To combat the flood of paperwork required to proceed with the record number of
foreclosure filings nationwide, banks, law firms, and other institutions resorted to a process known as ‘robosigning’ . . . .”).
214 See id. at 244 (“The foreclosure process can be very complicated given the legal requirements to
properly effectuate a foreclosure proceeding and the variety of parties involved.”).
215 See id. at 248–49.
216 See “Robo-Signing” of Mortgages Still a Problem, CBS NEWS (July 18, 2011, 8:54 PM), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/robo-signing-of-mortgages-still-a-problem/ (“Banks and their partner firms file mortgage
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Because millions of foreclosures were filed in such a short period of time
after the housing bubble burst, lenders began using a process called “robosigning” (sometimes called “robo-filing”) where a lender’s employee would
sign hundreds, or thousands, of affidavits and certifications for the lender
stating that the employee had personal knowledge of the facts of the
foreclosure.217 In reality, however, these employees had little or no knowledge
of what they were signing.218 One report stated that one “robo-signer” for
Nationwide Title Clearing Inc., signed his name on an average of five thousand
mortgage documents per day for companies like Citigroup and JPMorgan
Chase.219 In addition to the five thousand documents that this robo-signer
executed daily, Nationwide Title Clearing also employed a computer system
that automatically applied the signer’s signature to documents that he never
saw.220 These deceptive filings betray a history of strong property ownership
recordkeeping, which has been the basis of American property ownership for
more than three hundred years.221 As Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray
stated, “[Lenders] can’t pretend this is a fourth-grade student not quite filling
in the oval on a test. This is fraud.”222
Not only did robo-filing disgrace the history of American property
ownership, but it also vastly slowed recovery from the bubble’s burst.223
Mortgage and foreclosure filings are not the only area where robo-filing is a
cause for concern. With the growing level of student debt in the United States,
some scholars worry that if a large amount of student borrowers default on

documents with county deeds offices to prove that there are no liens on a property, that the bank owns a
mortgage or that a bank filing for foreclosure has the authority to do so.”).
217 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 249.
218 See id. at 249–50.
219 Prashant Gopal, No Breaks for Robo-signing Computer Stamping Files, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2010,
3:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-15/no-coffee-break-for-this-robo-signer-as-computerstamps-mortgage-documents.html.
220 Id.
221 “Robo-Signing” of Mortgages Still a Problem, supra note 216. (“The paper trail ensures a legal chain
of title on a property and has been the backbone of U.S. property ownership for more than 300 years.”).
222 Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghdady, 50 State Attorneys General Announce Foreclosure Probe,
WASH. POST BUS. (Oct. 13, 2010, 12:50 PM) (quotation marks omitted), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/12/AR2010101205604.html.
223 See Ray Brescia, Robo-Sign Scandal Gives State Attorneys General Opportunity to Move Towards a
Resolution of the Foreclosure Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:21 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/ray-brescia/leverage-the-robo-sign-sc_b_798396.html (“[T]he prospect of substantial civil
penalties and punitive damages, as well as injunctions preventing foreclosures from going ahead when tainted
by robo-sign practices, is considerable.”).
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their loans in a short period, then lenders may begin using this fraudulent
practice to resolve student debt cases on a large scale.224
Multiple factors make private student loan debt more likely to result in
default than federal student loans.225 Specifically, private student loans
typically impose higher interest rates than federal loans and are subject to less
regulation.226 In addition, federal student loans typically have more lenient
default provisions than private loans.227 Federal loans usually allow borrowers
a period of nine months after a missed payment before going into default.228
The default provisions of private loans vary between contracts, but due to a
lack of government regulation, some contracts consider a borrower to be in
default as soon as a single payment is missed.229 For example, an estimated
$8.1 billion in private student loans were in default in 2013 alone.230 This
figure represents more than 850,000 different loans.231 This high rate of
defaults suggests that it is only a matter of time before robo-filing becomes
prevalent in the private student loan industry.
Although private student loans have a higher risk of default, the threat of a
large-scale default is not contained only to private student loans. Between the
general rising cost of tuition and a sluggish job market, even federal loans that
are typically offered at below-market rates carry a major risk of default.232
According to statistics published by the Department of Education, payments

224 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 253 (“While robo-signing has been addressed, at least in
part, with respect to foreclosures, another potential debt collection flood could be on its way: student loans.”).
225 See id. at 255–56.
226 See id. at 255 (“However, these [private] loans . . . are often more expensive than federal student loans.
While federal student loans are strictly regulated, private lenders may charge higher variable interest rates,
may vary the interest rate based on the borrower’s credit score, or may charge prepayment penalty fees.”).
227 See id. (stating that federal loans generally allow a nine month cushion to borrowers after missing a
payment before entering default); Webley, Why Can’t You Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, supra
note 37 (“Basically, the only option with private loans is to repay them—and to repay them on the lender’s
timetable.”).
228 Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 255.
229 See id. at 255–56.
230 Id. at 259.
231 Id.
232 See Andrew Martin & Andrew L. Lehren, A Generation Hobbled by the Soaring Cost of College, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/student-loans-weighing-down-a-generationwith-heavy-debt.html? (“[I]n 2007, Congress made sure the interest rates on many of those [federal] loans
were well below commercial rates . . . .”); Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 259 (“With an increasing
number of students borrowing, and borrowing greater sums in a currently weak economy, complete with
decreased job prospects, the reality is that some students borrow more than they can reasonably expect to
repay.”).
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are only being made on 38% of the balance of federal student loan debt, down
from just 46% five years ago.233
In addition to the threat of mass default filings, there are similarities
between the subprime mortgage market in the period leading up to the 2008
crisis and the current student loan market which increase the likelihood that
robo-filings will eventually cause problems for student borrowers. One of these
similarities was pointed out by the National Consumer Law Center (the
“NCLC”), which stated that both the subprime mortgage market and the
private student lending market were “push markets” where products are
offered not only to fulfill consumer need, but also to satisfy investor
demand.234 Both markets also have incentives to increase the number of
individuals approved for a loan by reducing the required minimum credit score
to qualify.235 In short, the NCLC stated that “during the boom, [private student]
lenders made a high percentage of loans to weaker credits,” which is precisely
the behavior that led to the subprime mortgage crisis.236
Due to the similarities between the two markets, it logically follows that the
robo-signing, which was a problem in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis,
could be a hazardous consequence of allowing the student loan debt bubble to
continue to swell.237 Like in the subprime mortgage market, the confusion of
sorting out these fraudulent filings would impede any recovery effort,
prolonging the financial downturn that would occur if the student loan debt
bubble bursts. The best way to avoid this prolonged recession is to ensure that
the student loan debt bubble does not reach its bursting point by allowing
private student loans to be discharged in bankruptcy.

233

Martin & Lehren, supra note 232.
See Private Student Loans: Providing Flexibility and Opportunity to Borrowers?: Hearing Before the
S. Banking Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Prot., 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Deanne Loonin,
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center).
235 See id.
236 Id.
237 See Written Testimony of Rohit Chopra Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rohit Chopra, Assistant Director & Student Loan Ombudsman, Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau) (“[I]t is clear that many of you are keenly interested in finding solutions for some
of the troubling trends in the student loan market.”); Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 261 (“Given the
similarities between collection practices in the [student debt and subprime mortgage] markets, we can expect
to see similar collection tactics employed as more and more borrowers default and fall further into student loan
debt.”).
234

MUELLER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/4/2016 10:53 AM

NON-DISCHARGEABILITY OF PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS

261

CONCLUSION
Congress erred when it exempted private student loans from discharge in
the 2005 amendments to the Code. As a result of this provision, the level of
private student loan debt has surged in the United States, which has in turn
contributed to the skyrocketing cost of tuition.238 Congress thus needs to repeal
this change and should return § 523(a)(8) of the Code to its pre-2005 state.
A significant benefit of allowing private student loans to be discharged in
bankruptcy is that it would free up roughly 15% of the $1.2 trillion student
loan debt for more economically productive uses.239 And perhaps more
importantly, allowing discharge of private student debts would also remove the
false incentives of private lenders to over-lend to college students. If private
student loans could be discharged in bankruptcy, private lenders would begin
to treat student loans like all other types of credit and lend only when they
could be sure that borrowers would be able to re-pay. Consequently, the
number of student loans made per year would drop, perhaps even to their
pre-2005 levels.240
Over time, universities would be forced to take notice of this change
because some students would choose less costly institutions in the absence of
being able to obtain a near infinite private student loan. The risk of losing
students in response to a tuition increase will prevent universities from
increasing their tuition rates at the astounding rates seen in recent history.
Hopefully, over time, slowing the rise of tuition rates would have a secondary
effect of slowing the growth of student loan debts.
From examining the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, scholars were able to
learn certain lessons which must now be applied to the student loan market.241
The similarities between the two markets are quite pronounced—excessively
loose credit standards underlie and fuel both.242 These lax standards allow
individuals to borrow more than they are able to repay, causing them to enter
foreclosure or bankruptcy (depending on their type of debt). Thus, the result is
an increase in the number of default filings. This increase in turn causes
238

See Webley, Is Forgiving Student Loan Debt a Good Idea?, supra note 12.
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lenders to tighten lending standards at a time when individuals have a reduced
level of wealth, leading to a severe reduction in the amount of economic
activity overall in the country.243 Therefore, to prevent a large surge of
defaults, and the economic slowdown that they bring, lending standards need
to be gradually tightened to help deflate the growing student debt bubble. As
previously emphasized, allowing private debts to be discharged in bankruptcy
is one way to deflate this bubble.
Not only did the 2008 financial crisis teach America about the effects of a
bursting credit bubble, but it also warned scholars of the possible dangers of
large-scale defaults. Specifically, when lenders become overwhelmed by the
number of borrowers defaulting on their loans and must enact collection
actions against them, there is a huge amount of paperwork involved.244 In the
context of foreclosures, an employee of the lender must read and verify the
facts surrounding each particular mortgage to decide whether the bank had
proper standing to proceed with a foreclosure.245 Because there were so many
defaults, lenders were unable to effectively evaluate each filing, and therefore
began robo-signing the required documents.246 Individual employees would
testify to signing thousands of affidavits and certifications a day, each one
verifying that the employee had studied and was familiar with the information
contained within.247 To respond to this scandal, State Attorney Generals
imposed substantial civil and punitive damages, in addition to issuing
injunctions.248 This process prolonged the recovery period after the 2008
financial crisis and monopolized legal resources at an already strenuous time.
Due to the similarities of the student loan and subprime mortgage markets,
many scholars are now afraid that robo-signing could be an issue if student
borrowers begin defaulting on their loans en masse.249 This fear gives extra
weight to the argument that the student debt bubble needs to be deflated before
it pops.
Finally, although the exemption of student loans from discharge in
bankruptcy was passed under the guise of preventing abuse, there are other
243

Id. at 241.
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248 See Ray Brescia, supra note 223 (“[T]he prospect of substantial civil penalties and punitive damages,
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249 See Hopkins & Pustizzi, supra note 186, at 263–64.
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mechanisms preventing borrowers from abusing the student loan system,
rendering the § 523(a)(8) exemption unnecessary. One of these protections is
§ 707(b) of the Code, which includes multiple defenses to bankruptcy
abuses.250 This provision includes a means test that prevents above-median
debtors from abusing the system and instead channels them into a chapter 11 or
13 case, or dismisses the filing altogether.251 Students and recent graduates
who have not yet built up assets or have little to no monthly income are
especially likely to pass the means test,252 so courts consequently have
designed another way to prevent against abuse: Section 707(b)(3) allows a
court to dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding if it believes that the petition was
filed in “bad faith” or if the “totality of the circumstances . . . demonstrate
abuse.”253
Along with these abuse-prevention mechanisms in the Code, almost all
private student loans today require a creditworthy cosigner in order to be
approved.254 Therefore, even if a student defaults on his payments and has no
real tangible assets for the lender to seize, another adult is on the hook for
payment of the full balance of the debts. Many lenders have requirements
about cosigners’ financial abilities, ensuring that some collateral will be
available to repay the lender if the student defaults.255
In conclusion, it seems that the 2005 amendment to § 523(a)(8) of the Code
was a line-item snuck into a larger bill that serves no meaningful function to
protect against abuse. The consequences of this seemingly “small” provision,
however, have been exceedingly dangerous and substantial, leading to
spiraling tuition and student debt levels in the past nine years. If left unaltered,
the exemption of private student loans from discharge could cause the student
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See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) (containing the means test and totality of the circumstances test).
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).
252 See id.
253 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3).
254 See Tompor, supra note 141 (stating that roughly 90% of the private student loans issued in 2011
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255 See Private Student Loans, FIN. AID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/privatestudentloans.phtml (last
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loan debt bubble to burst, and, in turn, a rippling economic effect similar to
that in 2008 from which the nation is still struggling to recover.
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